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When considering the relation between languages, it seems 
intuitive that there are common references reflecting simple 
empirical observations.  One would not expect there to be any 
great difficulty in translating terms such as “tree” or “chair;” what 
difficulties arise, however, as translation moves away from these 
basic referential terms?  Willard Quine writes in “Meaning and 
Translation” that “Empirical meaning is what the sentences of one 
language and their firm translations in another language have in 
common.”1  Quine argues that linguistic meaning is purely 
referential and is derived from the symbolism of a term.  He uses 
radical translation—a theoretical situation of creating correlations 
between a familiar language and one completely alien (which he 
calls the “jungle” language)—to draw his point, claiming that 
“What we objectively have is just an evolving adjustment to 
nature, reflected in an evolving set of dispositions to be prompted 
by stimulations to assent to or dissent from occasion sentences.”2  
This view of language is one which begins with common 
references such as basic objects of perception, and then builds 
more complex terms, phrases, and combinations of meanings to 
                                                
1 Willard Quine, “Meaning and Translation,” The Translation Studies Reader: 
Second Edition, ed. Lawrence Venuti (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 94. 





express more conceptual notions.  The conceptual grid of 
language as a whole is then that of empirical perception—any 
abstraction is the combination of these more basic terms, and no 
inter-lingual equivalence would be guaranteed between 
abstractions, even assuming that the basic terms have a degree of 
equivalence. 
Quine states that “…the analogies [or, correlations] weaken 
as we move out toward the theoretical sentences, farthest from 
observation.  Thus who would undertake to translate “Neutrinos 
lack mass” into the jungle language?  If anyone does, we may 
expect him to coin new native words or distort the usage of old 
ones.”3  This claim seems true, regardless of whether we accept his 
argument of the empirical nature of inter-lingual relations and of a 
minimal conceptual grid—sense and consideration show how 
difficult translation and understanding become as we move from 
concrete terms towards those more abstract.  For example, the 
phrase “Rabbits have weight” naturally shows itself to be easier to 
translate than “Neutrinos lack mass” due to the former’s basic 
nature of linguistic meaning and the abstract, complex correlations 
of meaning contained in the latter phrase. 
What implications does this difficulty of translating 
abstract language hold in regards to practical matters, outside of 
the realm of Quine’s experiment of radical translation?  
Considering philosophy as a study typically involving abstract 
terms and concepts, we are then faced with an interesting and 
extremely significant difficulty of translating philosophical works.  
Conveyance of meaning through translation is obviously a crucial 
aim for any work that is translated—with this concern of the 
translatability of abstract terminology, however, philosophy seems 
to have an added element of difficulty.  As a field which relies on 
an array of abstract vocabulary, how do we translate a work and 
still remain faithful to both the thinker and the source language 
(SL)?  By translating key terms do we risk disturbing the very 
essence or meaning of a work, and by transplanting an author’s 
thought do we risk changing the very message itself?  Our goal is 
to examine this problem—it will be seen that this is a very real 
risk, and that complete equivalence cannot always be expected, 
                                                





and that in some cases the author’s very ideas can be endangered 
by translation and interpretation. 
 The first example is the ancient Greek term nomos.  
Richard Kraut tells how “the Greek term that is translated as 
‘law’—nomos—covers not only the enactments of a lawgiver or 
legislature, but also the customs, norms, and unwritten rules of a 
community.”4 Our contemporary concept of law lacks the same 
meaning as that of the Greek culture.  We consider law as existing 
beyond societal norms: as Kraut points out, we may say “that 
slavery is contrary to the moral law, and that this law existed 
before the wrongness of slavery began to receive general 
recognition.”  On the contrary, nomos necessarily includes the 
sociological background of a community and its legal system.  
There is a cultural discrepancy, and therefore a potential loss of 
meaning, between the term nomos and the English word “law” into 
which it is typically translated.5 
In his article titled “The Problem of Translating” Hans 
W.L. Freudenthal discusses this problem of equivalence in 
translation.  Words are not isolated terms with static meanings—he 
claims that “Each word has been coined in a specific atmosphere, it 
has its own history; the metamorphoses of meaning throughout 
time often demonstrate this fact [dynamic, mutable nature of 
terms] with a distinctness baffling to linguists.”6  He brings up an 
example from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 
discussing Helen Zimmern’s translation of de Epochistik as 
“science of epochs”: 
 
The phrase “science of epochs” makes no sense at all, and 
the context suggests a very different meaning.  It is obvious 
that the word Epochistik will not be found in any 
dictionary.  The translation of Nietzsche’s works 
presupposes a study of the peculiarities of his brilliant style 
and acquaintance with the fact that his procedure was 
willfully creative in the matter of the coinage of words.  
                                                
4 Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 105-106 
5 Ibid., 105-108. 
6 Hans W.L. Freudenthal, “The Problem of Translating,” The Modern Language 





But more than this: one has to be well informed 
concerning the things constantly present to this 
philosopher’s inner eye and which provide him continually 
with the images, analogies and similarities that he 
explores.7 
 
In this case we see the problem that Quine discussed in 
approaching abstract translation—Epochistik is a term which lacks 
one-to-one equivalence or any easy correlation that does not 
involve significant footnoting or drawn out language.  Interestingly 
enough, in this case even those solutions would seemingly fall 
short, as footnoting and extenuated, lengthy explanations are by no 
means Nietzsche’s style, and would risk changing the very nature 
of his thought—this, however, is an issue which we will briefly 
delay. 
 Does this difficulty and potential untranslatability of 
Epochistik then damage the meaning that Nietzsche intended?  If 
“science of epochs” is not an accurate translation, then some of the 
value or meaning is definitely lost—the question then is if this 
difficulty is significant in whether or not it hinders the conveyance 
of meaning.  Another example may be seen in translations of The 
Genealogy of Morals.  An extremely important aspect of this text 
is the separation between the terms das Böseste and das Schlechte.  
For Nietzsche, the separation between these words, translated by 
Walter Kaufmann as “evil” and “bad” respectively, is immensely 
important to the entire discussion of the “slave” and “nobility,” and 
the very antithesis drawn between these opposite concepts hinge 
around understanding a clear division between the two.  In his 
introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra Kaufmann discusses 
difficulties with the translation by Thomas Common, writing that 
Common “coins ‘baddest’ in a passage in which Nietzsche says 
‘most evil’”8 in The Genealogy of Morals.  Thomas Common’s 
apparent failure to draw an oppositional difference between “Good 
and Bad” and “Good and Evil” by mistranslating das Böseste 
greatly damages Nietzsche’s entire project and demonstrates 
significant loss of meaning stemming from the same basic 
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8 Walter Kaufmann, Editor’s Preface, in Frederick Nietzsche, The Portable 





problems seen in the difficulty of understanding what 
Freudenthal considered “the philosopher’s inner eye.” 
 In putting trust into translations, one would hope that it 
would portray the most accurate equivocation possible and would 
not contain gross mistranslations such as Common’s coinage of 
“baddest.”  Nonetheless, even in an ideal translation, the problem 
discussed above is very real and it is understood that translation 
lies in finding a compromise between the source text and the target 
language.  In response to this worry, some translators have chosen 
to leave certain crucial terms untranslated and not risk replacing 
them with a word from the target language which may be loaded 
with a meaning that varies from the source term.  One example of 
this is the English translations of Heidegger and the term Dasein.  
In a version of Being and Time translated by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson, this word is left untranslated and explained in 
its first instance by a footnote.  They tell how “the word ‘Dasein’ 
plays so important a role in this work and is already so familiar to 
the English-speaking reader who has read about Heidegger, that it 
seems simpler to leave it untranslated except in the relatively rare 
passages…”9  This practice of not translating terms then tries to 
avoid this problem of finding a word in the TL that signifies a 
closely accurate meaning for a crucial and difficult word in the SL.  
By leaving the original word untranslated, which can be seen as in 
a sense coining a new word in the TL, the translator then decides to 
explain the meaning outside of the original author’s thought itself, 
using mechanisms such as footnotes—through this the term may 
be expanded and explained more proficiently and still be kept in a 
similar context as the original work. 
 Footnoting and other methods of avoiding the problem of 
untranslatability seem to be closely related to what Jonathan Cohen 
had in mind when he claims in “Are Philosophical Theses Relative 
to Language?” that “this is what constitutes a fundamental 
difference between philosophy and grammar—when philosophical 
theses mention an expression there is nothing to prevent that 
expression’s being translated along with the rest of the thesis.  You 
can find, for instance, books about the rules of Aristotelian logic 
written in many different natural languages and all using the same 
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example for a syllogism…”10  Cohen’s statement is in the 
context of an argument between the translatability of grammatical 
and philosophical theses, and while this may be seemingly off-
topic, his claim is one which is important and shows both truth and 
falsity.  Cohen uses the universal syllogism “all men are mortal” to 
support this assertion of the translatability of philosophical theses, 
and his claim in this specific instance does seem to be true.  This 
example, however, is a very basic instance of “philosophical” 
thought—neither the terms nor the overall proposition portray 
much of a degree of abstraction.  The thesis “All men are mortal” 
is undoubtedly less complex of a claim than a statement such as 
“True moral action follows the categorical imperative.”  This is no 
attempt to make an overall comparison between the translatability 
of Aristotle and Kant, but rather to show a flaw in Cohen’s 
argument.  Granted, philosophical terms and theses may be 
translated with different degrees of equivalence, as a simpler 
proposition such as Cohen’s example seems to lend itself to 
translation rather easily while the latter example would be much 
more difficult.  Nonetheless, his argument seems to fall short of 
any serious critique of the examples given previously—in many 
instances translation deals with concepts of abstraction which are 
loaded with cultural and linguistic meaning that are both 
inseparable (at least to some degree) from the SL and alien to the 
TL.  Furthermore, Cohen’s argument also necessarily considers 
philosophical concepts distinctly separate from grammar and 
language itself.  What happens when philosophy is not separate 
from the use of language? 
An example of this problem may be seen in poetry.  When 
translating poetry do we concern ourselves primarily with retaining 
the meaning of the words and sacrifice the sense and feeling of the 
work?  Or, instead, do we retain the latter and risk damage to the 
meaning, which may be lost from poorer word choices?  Either 
way, the translator risks damage to the original instance of art.  The 
previous examples of philosophical terms in translation 
demonstrate that we cannot always expect a one-to-one 
equivalence when moving into another language, and instead must 
use devices such as footnoting or expanding a thought into a longer 
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sequence of terms or phrases.  In many instances it could be 
argued that this does not damage the meaning of a philosophical 
thesis or of an abstract concept, such as the argument expressed by 
Cohen.  What if, however, philosophy held similar aspects as those 
of poetry and we could not separate grammar, syntax, and meaning 
so easily? 
In many cases this seems to be a rather absurd question.  
Philosophy, in numerous respects, does seem to be separate from 
the sense of language in the overall work—metaphysics, for 
example, is typically a study in which language serves to logically 
connect philosophical terms.  In this sense, while the terms may 
face difficulties of translation, the translator would most likely 
favor the equivalence of terms over the style of the SL.  But not all 
philosophy is formatted or stylized as metaphysical discourse, not 
all authors use language for the same purposes, and the notion that 
philosophy could use language and feeling in the same way as 
poetry is quite important to the way in which we consider its 
translation. 
Nietzsche’s work serves as an excellent example for this 
consideration.  Unlike metaphysics and similar philosophy, 
Nietzsche sought after a very different project.  It is not a project 
which, like generations of thinkers before, sought to define lofty 
eternals or definite absolutes.  Nietzsche’s philosophy is that which 
is seen in his works such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The 
Antichrist—his project is that of the “revaluation of values,” of the 
pursuit of perspectives.  Sarah Kofman discusses this very nature 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy, writing that  
 
Tyranny is reprehensible in all its forms, including that of 
any philosopher seeking to raise his spontaneous evaluation 
to the status of an absolute value and his style to that of a 
philosophical style ‘in itself’, opposed to poetic style ‘in 
itself’ like truth opposed to untruth, good to evil… Whether 
writing is conceptual or metaphorical (and since Nietzsche 
the opposition has hardly applied any longer), the essential 
thing is… to be at enough of a distance from it to make fun 
of it.11 
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The typical philosophical style—what Kofman argues as the style 
of the “metaphysician”—is that of transcending both meaning and 
language to absolutes, to logical propositions which are universal, 
or as close to universal as possible.  This is not Nietzsche, and his 
language mirrors his philosophy.  Similar to poetry, language does 
not serve merely as a vehicle for Nietzsche’s meaning, but rather it 
works in conjunction with his philosophy.  His language and his 
thought are not separate—together, they are his meaning.  To quote 
Walter Kaufmann, who seems to understand this very same point:  
 
…it is impossible to be faithful to the content while 
sacrificing the form: meaning and mood are inseparable.  If 
the translator makes things easy for himself and omits a 
play on words, he unwittingly makes a lighthearted pun or 
rhyme look serious, if he does not reduce the whole 
passage to nonsense.12 
 
For Nietzsche this mutual connection is that of his use of 
metaphor—by creating this reflection between meaning and sense, 
between his thought and the very use of his language, he brings 
about the revaluation that his philosophy itself cries out for.  By 
the use of metaphor and poetic style he creates the ability for a 
plurality of perspectives and the capacity for his text to evolve.  As 
our concepts of “truth” change, so must our perspective, our 
thought, and therefore, also our style. 
How do we translate this plurality of style and meaning in a 
work in which they are inseparable?  One reason for Kaufmann’s 
retranslations was that,  
 
For one thing, they completely misrepresent the mood of 
the original—beginning, but unfortunately not ending, with 
their many unjustified archaisms, their ‘thou’ and ‘ye’ with 
the clumsy attendant verb forms, and their whole 
misguided effort to approximate the King James Bible… 
More often than not, he [Thomas Common] either 
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overlooks a play on words or misunderstands it, an in 
both cases makes nonsense of Nietzsche.13 
  
In this criticism then we see a failure to convey this style and the 
subsequent loss of meaning, the very loss that, “abets the common 
misconception of the austere Nietzsche, when, in fact, no other 
philosopher knew better how to laugh at himself.”14  That is one 
way, then, which it seems we should not translate Nietzsche—
criticism of previous faults may help us, but how do we retain the 
very style which Common seemed to betray? 
Kaufmann explains his attempt at a better translation, 
writing that “an effort has been made to preserve as much as 
possible of his cadences, even where they are awkwardly groping 
or overstrained.  What is thus lost in smoothness is gained for the 
understanding of the development of his style and personality.”15  
Here, foreignizing is preferable to domesticating Nietzsche’s 
language and Kaufmann surely shows this with his criticism of 
Common’s translation and his own preference for “style and 
personality” over smoothness.  Kaufmann’s decision is correct if 
Nietzsche’s style and meaning are inseparable—why risk 
sacrificing both the beauty and innate meaning of writing for a 
higher degree of ease or smoothness? 
The pursuit of this brief talk, however, is not to define 
methods by which translations can become flawless, nor should it 
be seen as an attempt, or at least much of one, to recommend better 
devices or practices for the translator.  We have seen how cultural 
and inter-lingual differences hinder the translation of abstract 
terms—Quine’s claim that “…continuities [between languages], by 
facilitating translation, encourage an illusion of subject matter…”16 
in this case seems to be true.  That is not to say abstract terms 
cannot be translated, but instead that we must realize the existence 
of conceptual differences between languages and beware of 
assuming that a term from the SL holds the very same connotations 
and correlations as the word that we perceive to generate it in the 
TL.  Furthermore, we must also be aware that translation of 
                                                
13 Kaufmann, Editor’s Preface, 107-108. 
14 Kaufmann, Introduction, 6. 
15 Ibid., 3. 





philosophy and of conceptual thought in general cannot be 
viewed as the translation primarily of vocabulary, but also of the 
translation of thought as a whole.  With the connection between 
style and meaning which was seen in Nietzsche, we must realize 
that to translate is to interpret and that by disregarding or 
privileging any particular aspect we risk damage to the work, 
especially when there is such a dependence on language. 
This difficulty of translation is, at least in part, a reflection 
of Nietzsche’s various interpretations and ideas which, through the 
metaphor, show (or, perhaps only encourage) multiplicity and 
change as the only permanency.  Kaufmann’s criticisms of 
Common in many respects do seem to ring true, as being unable to 
see Nietzsche’s humor within his seriousness, his carefulness 
within his rashness—in short, this very plurality of perspectives—
would doubtlessly damage the translation of Nietzsche’s language 
and his philosophy.  At the same time, however, if as Sarah 
Kofman wrote, “A new reading/writing destroys the traditional 
categories of the book as a closed totality containing a definitive 
meaning, the author’s; in such a way it deconstructs the idea of the 
author as a master of the meaning of the work …”, then maybe we 
may wish to seek particular meaning from the ambiguity and 
multiplicity, from the very “pluralism of interpretations and their 
renewal.”17  Perhaps we cannot completely discard any translation, 
and instead consider different interpretations in translation and if 
perhaps, as Walter Benjamin wrote, “all great texts contain their 
potential translation between the lines…”18
                                                
17 Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, 116. 
18  Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator: An Introduction to the 
Translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens,” trans. Harry Zohn, The 
Translation Studies Reader: Second Edition, ed. Lawrence Venuti (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2004), 7. 
